Vendor Breaches Hit Expedia, JPMorgan and Visa: How Small Businesses Can Close Old Vendor Access

· 6 min readSupply Chain

Branded graphic: Vendor breaches hit big brands, close your old vendor access

Quick take

  • Expedia, JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard all say recent data exposures came through outside vendors, not their own core systems.
  • Researchers found a related cloud attack worked largely through old vendor access that nobody had shut off.
  • Small businesses face the same risk. Use the checklist below to find and close forgotten vendor access this week.

Some of the biggest names in travel and banking just learned a hard lesson: your data is only as safe as your weakest vendor.

Over the past two weeks, an extortion group calling itself n0n has claimed data thefts tied to well-known companies. Several of those companies say the trouble started at a third-party provider.

This is called a supply chain attack (when criminals break into a company you trust, then use that trust to reach you). Here's what happened, and what it means for a small business.

What happened

Expedia: "a third-party data platform provider"

On Nov. 12, Expedia Group confirmed that attackers compromised "a third-party data platform provider" and used its trusted access to reach systems at multiple companies, including Expedia (Skift).

Expedia has not named the vendor or said what data was exposed. It called the group's data claims "unverified claims from criminals" (The Seattle Times).

JPMorgan, Visa and Mastercard: vendor incidents

On Nov. 16, n0n posted claims about JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard. All three then pointed to incidents at outside providers (SecurityWeek).

  • JPMorgan said attackers likely reached "certain marketing data" held by vendors, which may include some customer names and email addresses.
  • Visa said the claims tie to "a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific," and that its own systems and card numbers were not affected.
  • Mastercard said a third-party provider exposed a limited number of email addresses for a small group of cardholders in one benefit program.

None of the three has named the providers involved (SecurityWeek).

The group behind the claims

n0n surfaced in September and lists roughly 200 alleged victims on its leak site (SecurityWeek). Many of those claims have not been independently confirmed.

Starbucks, for example, appeared on one researcher list of possible victims. It said it "found no evidence of unauthorized access" to its network (The Seattle Times).

The cloud attack that shows how it works

Security firm Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, reported a cloud attack on Nov. 9. Between Oct. 14 and Oct. 26, an attacker used credentials (login keys) tied to Qubole, a big-data platform, to get into customer cloud accounts (Wiz).

Wiz later noted a report that an actor calling itself "n0n" claimed responsibility. Wiz said it has not tied the campaign to other public activity (Wiz). Expedia has not confirmed whether its breach is related to Qubole (Skift).

The open doors were old ones

Here's the part every business owner should read twice.

Wiz found that most of the access the attacker used was not otherwise in use. In most environments it studied, the attacker was the only one using that vendor access in October. The permissions were still switched on, so the break-ins worked (Wiz).

Sentra put it plainly: "The doors the attacker used were old ones." The vendor's access was still in place long after companies had stopped using Qubole (Sentra).

Once inside, the attacker looked for stored passwords and keys and downloaded files from cloud storage (Wiz).

Why this matters for small businesses

You may not run a giant cloud system. But you almost certainly give outsiders access to your stuff.

Think about who has a login, a key, or a connection into your business:

  • Your IT company or former IT person
  • Your website designer or hosting company
  • Your bookkeeper, payroll or tax service
  • Marketing, email and CRM tools (CRM means customer relationship software)
  • Apps connected to your Google Workspace or Microsoft 365 account
  • Remote-support tools your vendors installed on your computers

Every one of those is a door. When a vendor gets hacked, or when you stop using a vendor but never close the door, that access can be used against you.

Notice where the leaked data sat in several of these cases: with marketing vendors. Customer email lists and campaign data are often shared widely and watched loosely.

The rules already expect this

If your business falls under the FTC Safeguards Rule (many non-bank financial businesses, such as tax preparers, auto dealers that finance and mortgage brokers), you must oversee your service providers. That means picking capable vendors, requiring safeguards in your contracts, and checking on them from time to time (16 CFR 314.4(f)).

The same rule calls for access controls that limit people to only the information they need (16 CFR 314.4(c)(1)).

Vendor access checklist for small businesses

You can do most of this in an afternoon. Start with the vendors that touch customer or payment data.

  • Make a vendor list. Write down every outside company or person with access to your email, files, website, bank, payroll or customer data.
  • Close the doors you no longer use. Remove logins, API keys (app-to-app passwords) and connected apps for any vendor you've stopped working with. This was the big lesson from the Qubole attack (Wiz).
  • Review connected apps. In Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, check which third-party apps have access to your accounts and remove the ones you don't recognize or need.
  • Give the least access needed. A web designer doesn't need your accounting files. Limit each vendor to only what their job requires.
  • Turn on MFA everywhere. MFA (multi-factor authentication) adds a second step, like a code on your phone. Require it for staff and vendor accounts. CISA says to enforce it with technical settings, then check that everyone is actually enrolled (CISA).
  • Rotate shared passwords and keys. If a vendor you use is in the news for a breach, change any passwords or keys you've shared with them, right away.
  • Don't store secrets in plain sight. Keep passwords in a password manager, not in spreadsheets, emails or shared folders an intruder could search.
  • Put security in the contract. Ask vendors how they protect your data and how fast they'll tell you about a breach. Get it in writing.
  • Share less customer data. Only send marketing and other vendors the fields they truly need. Data they never get can't leak.
  • Keep logs turned on. In several environments Wiz studied, missing logs meant responders couldn't see which files the attacker read (Wiz).
  • Know who to call. Report cyber incidents to the FBI at IC3.gov. New Jersey businesses can also report to the NJCCIC, the state's cybersecurity office.

Watch for follow-up scams

When customer emails leak, phishing (fake messages that trick you into clicking or paying) often follows. Criminals can use real names and real account details to sound convincing.

Warn your team: if a message about a "breach," a refund, or an account problem pushes you to act fast, stop. Contact the company using a phone number or website you already trust.

The bottom line

These big companies didn't necessarily get hacked through their own front door. Criminals came in through partners.

For a Newark shop, a New Jersey medical office, or any small firm, the fix starts simple: know who has access, and shut off what you don't use.

Not sure where your vendor doors are? Contact Gr8 Eagle Cyber for a free consultation and risk assessment. We'll help you map your vendor access and close the gaps.

Sources

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